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This paper explores migration movements and remittances patterns in Macedonia since 
independence and studies the migration policy challenges Macedonia will be likely to 
face after its entry into the EU. Concerning recent migration movements, considerable 
outflows from Macedonia are found as well as indications for a serious brain drain. Re-
mittances to Macedonia–which are quite big–seem to constitute a relevant support for a 
number of households and can be expected to diminish the incidence of poverty. In the 
light of the EU accession process, the Macedonian government will have to introduce 
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Introduction 
The free movement of people and its impact on sending and receiving countries has 
been a controversially discussed issue in the context of European Union’s Eastern 
enlargements. Because of high differences in income and living standards between new 
and old EU member states, politicians and the public in EU-15 countries expected an 
increasing East-West labour migration after the accession of 8 Eastern European coun-
tries in May 2004 and two further in January 2007. Worries evolved that migrants from 
the new EU member states would take away jobs from native workers in the EU-15, 
lower their wages or immigrate in search of state benefits. Furthermore, social tensions 
were anticipated as a result of likely growing population diversity. In contrast it was 
argued that East-West labour movements would assist the European economy in the 
longer term, helping to enhance welfare and economic growth of European Union mem-
ber states. Nevertheless, while labour mobility can be expected to stabilize economic 
growth across the EU as a whole, gains may not be distributed equally and it may put 
pressure on local labour markets of receiving economies and on the social cohesion at 
the local level. 
Labour migration after enlargements was not only assumed to affect EU-15 states, 
but likewise the new Eastern European members of the EU. These countries anticipated 
a part of their young and well-educated labour force to leave for the West, thus reducing 
economic growth and welfare at home. On the other hand, positive impacts on the econ-
omy, for example in form of remittances and human capital increases as a result of re-
turned migrants were expected. 
This paper explores migration movements and remittances patterns in Macedonia 
since independence and studies the migration policy challenges Macedonia will be 
likely to face after its entry into the European Union. Because of its economic situation, 
Macedonia is expected to primarily function as a migrant sending region in the Euro-
pean Union context, although return, transit, refugee and asylum migration may like-
wise play a role.
1 The following section explores the impact of migration on the econ-
omy and society of sending countries in general terms, while the migration experience 
of transition countries that have joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 will be addressed in the 
second section. The third section looks at the Macedonian migration experience since 
independence, studies the migration potential in Macedonia in the light of EU acces-
sion, examines the impact of remittances and evaluates the salience of new EU coun-
tries’ migration experiences for Macedonia. The final section formulates policy recom-
mendations following from this analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The analysis of refugee and asylum movements as well as the implications of these migrations for Ma-
cedonian governmental policies in the context of European Union accession is beyond the scope of this 
report. A number of recent papers have delt with these issues (IOM 2007, CRPM 2007, van Selm 2007, 
IOM 2009). 
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1 The impact of migration on the economy and society of send-
ing countries: general considerations 
As international migration has expanded considerably in recent years, including more 
and more transition and developing countries into the international migration system, 
increasing attention has been devoted to the evaluation of migration impacts on sending 
economies and societies.
2 Migration influences the home countries of labour migrants 
through various channels, most importantly through changes in labour supply, brain 




1.1 Labour market and brain drain 
While the emigration of labour leads to a decrease in the labour supply in sending coun-
tries, the further impacts of migration depend on a number of factors, for example on 
the age structure and skills of emigrants as well as on the labour market situation in 
sending regions. If people leave to work abroad, output in the home country tends to 
decline if emigrated work force can not easily be replaced because of tight labour mar-
kets. However, labour emigration is not expected to have a negative effect on output 
and productivity in sending regions if unemployment in the respective skill group is 
high and a large supply of persons exists which can substitute the leaving labour force. 
This situation stimulates an increasing demand for formerly unemployed persons in 
sending economies, leading to new employment opportunities. In case emigrants can 
not be replaced, labour shortages may result which could hamper economic growth. 
However, an increasing demand for labour in sending countries may lead to rising 
wages. Thus the labour force left behind may profit from emigration although economic 
risks such as inflationary processes might occur as well. Because migrants often leave 
specific regions in sending countries, the overall effects of labour movements will not 
be distributed equally throughout the sending economy. In this context, the integration 
of home countries’ labour markets plays a decisive role in determining the outcome of 
labour migration. The better domestic labour markets are integrated, the greater will be 
the effects of labour migration for the economy as a whole. 
The emigration of highly skilled persons is commonly described as ‘brain drain’ and 
it is generally expected to have a negative impact on sending economies in lowering 
production and growth. In addition, the out flow of highly skilled people who have been 
educated and trained in home countries causes a waste of public resources. The emigra-
tion of health care workers, skilled administrators and teachers is seen to be the most 
harmful, given these workers can not be replaced. In the concrete situation much de-
pends on the age structure, the skill levels and professions of emigrants, as well as on 
the economic preconditions in home countries. For example, if highly skilled migrants 
                                                 
2 A comprehensive overview can be found in Katseli et al. 2006 and Inotai 2008. 
  2 Migration and Remittances in Macedonia  
 
had been unemployed in sending regions or had not been occupied according to their 
profession, adverse effects would be reduced. Furthermore the emigration of highly 
skilled people may encourage the younger generation in sending countries to invest in 
higher education to be able to benefit from migration (Stark and Wang 2002). This 
might result in a growing number of highly skilled persons at home, given that not all of 
those who newly earned a higher education leave the country. On the other hand it has 
been discussed recently that studying abroad may lead towards (permanent) labour mi-
gration (Hanson 2008: 33). In the United States for example, many immigration visa for 
skilled occupations have been received by foreign students from American universities. 
Studying abroad may thus be used as an entrance ticket to work in the country where a 
university degree has been achieved. 
International labour migration is often accompanied by the return of people who had 
gone abroad. In a number of cases it has been observed that return migrants benefit 
from the experience of working in a foreign country, after coming back. As a result, 
they may earn higher wages as comparative natives or they may more often be self-
employed.
3 In addition to new skills, valuable management experience, entrepreneurial 
know how and access to global networks, returning migrants may bring venture capital, 
enhancing economic growth and welfare at home. 
 
 
1.2 The impact of remittances 
Many migrant sending countries receive considerable (financial) transfers from their 
citizens, living and working abroad. A number of studies have argued that the inflow of 
remittances in various forms – ranging from bank transfers to gifts in kind – play an 
important role for poverty reduction and economic development (Buch and Kuckulenz 
2004, Chami et al. 2008, World Bank 2006a). After foreign investment, remittances are 
the second-largest source of financial flows to developing countries and they are gener-
ally higher than Development Aid (Ratha 2003). Among other factors such as educa-
tion, income level, intention to invest or to insure the family at home against risks, the 
motivation of migrants to remit depends on the duration of stay. Temporary migrants 
seem to be much more concerned in sending remittances home than permanent migrants 
(Glytsos 1997). 
Remittances help the population in migrant sending countries to cope with the dis-
tress of poverty, the inefficiencies of local labour markets and the break-down of the 
social security system.
4 It is highlighted that remittances support families to survive in 
providing them with the means to buy food and other resources, to invest in the educa-
tion of their children and to improve the housing situation. In a macroeconomic context 
it is argued that remittances advance consumption and growth, help to finance the trade 
                                                 
3 In Albania, for example, return migrants are more engaged in working as managers and in being self-
employed after return, compared to those people who had not emigrated (Kilic et al. 2007). 
4 Poverty during economic transition has been considerably mitigated in Albania by the receipt of remit-
tances (De Soto 2002). 
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deficit and contributed to exchange rate stability. In addition remittances are assumed to 
strengthen the banking system and increase competition in local banking through the 
simplification of bank transfers (Kireyev 2006). 
It has to be remarked that remittances are also related to a number of potentially ad-
verse effects with respect to governmental policy, monetary outcomes, investment and 
labour supply. Because remittances create a safety net for receiving households, they 
might mitigate the pressure for the home countries’ governments to engage in reforming 
the economy and the social welfare system. A high inflow of remittances is also likely 
to fuel inflationary pressure and enlarge the trade deficit. Furthermore, remittances 
might increase family consumption but may not be used for investment in productive 
assets (Taylor 1992). In a number of cases, this situation has been commented nega-
tively by researchers. However, development economists have pointed to the multiplier 
effect of remittance consumption which may be as large as 300% and which often fa-
vours rural communities (Adelman and Taylor 1990). Empirical research provides some 
support for remittances resulting in investment activities, although these investments are 
typically made into real assets, such as housing, land and small firms (Roberts et al. 
2008: 23). Further potential adverse effects of remittances have been associated with 
respect to distributional effects. Because remittances are only transferred to a part of the 
home countries’ population growing wealth disparities may result. Theoretical studies 
and empirical research also discussed moral hazard problems in households, receiving 
remittances (Naiditsch and Vranceanu 2007, Görlich et al. 2007). As Azam and Gubert 
(2006) discovered for African countries, remittance receiving households may exploit 
the non-observability of their poverty coping activities and reduce labour supply. De-
spite earning little, those households consume the benefits of remittances and lower the 
labour efforts of household adults. To the contrary, Görlich et al. (2007) showed in the 
case of Moldova that living in a migrant household resulted in higher probabilities of 




1.3 Social impacts of migration 
Emigration does not only have an impact on the economic development of sending 
countries, it also influences the social situation in countries of origin as well as gender 
roles and family cohesion in migrants’ households. An important aspect of emigration 
relates to the families left behind, particularly to the situation of children and dependent 
household members such as elderly. Although families of migrants are in most cases 
economically better off than comparable households in the sending region, children in 
these households frequently grow up with a single parent or with relatives and fre-
quently suffer from disintegrated families. On the other hand, children in migrants’ 
families often enjoy a better education. Gender roles in migrants’ families are a further 
issue which might change dramatically in the course of migration movements. If male 
household heads move out, this may strengthen the role of women within the family left 
behind and provide females with more responsibility and financial independence. How-
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ever, there is evidence that more and more women emigrate because of a growing de-
mand for female migrants in the service sector. It can be expected that these females 
gain in importance as bread winners for the family left behind, although the social costs 
for their children might be high. It has to be considered though that not much research 
has been done on these issues yet. 
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2 The EU migration experience after enlargements in 2004 and 
2007 
Because of the political pressure by some EU-15 member states, primarily Austria and 
Germany, a transition period of restricted labour migration has been introduced by the 
European Commission for a maximum of 7 years (2+3+2) after enlargements in 2004 
and 2007.
5 This allowed EU-15 states to restrict the immigration of labour migrants 
from the new Eastern European member countries according to the regulations already 
in force.
6 After May 2004, all EU-15 states except for the UK, Ireland and Sweden in-
troduced some kind of restrictions with respect to the admission of East European la-
bour migrants (Commission of the European Communities 2006). Only three EU-8 
countries
7 namely Poland, Slovenia and Hungary adopted reciprocity to EU-15 states 
applying restrictions, while none of the EU-8 countries restricted the access of workers 
from other EU-8 states. 
The imposition of transition arrangements in 2004 – in the form of welfare and la-
bour market entrance restrictions – demonstrated that most EU-15 countries were still 
more concerned with the domestic risks of immigration than its opportunities. Two 
years later, in 2006, the majority of EU-15 countries abolished or relaxed migration 
restrictions indicating that they were expecting more benefits from East-West labour 
migration than costs. However, when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, the 
majority of EU-15 countries – including the UK and Ireland – restricted the immigra-
tion of workers from these countries into their labour markets according to the transition 
arrangements agreed upon in 2004. Only Finland and Sweden allowed the free access of 
workers from Bulgaria and Romania after the 2007 round of enlargement (Drew and 
Sriskandarajah 2007). Among the EU-8 countries only Hungary decided to impose 




2.1. Post-enlargement migration: the experience of receiving EU 
countries 
Against the background of transition arrangements on labour migration by most EU-15 
countries it does not come by surprise that the UK and Ireland have received by far 
more labour immigrants from EU-8 countries than predicted. Whereas forecasts ex-
pected a net migration of approximately 24,000 people to the UK until the end of 2005, 
                                                 
5 For a detailed description see Heinz and Ward-Warmedinger 2006 and European Integration Consor-
tium IAB, CMR, fRDB, GEP, WIFO, wiiw (2009): Labour mobility within the EU in the context of 
enlargement and the functioning of transitional arrangements. Final report. Nuremberg. 
6 Vice versa, the new Eastern European Union members could restrict labour migration from other EU 
countries. 
7 EU-8 countries include all states that joined the EU in 2004 besides Cyprus and Malta. 
8 These were abolished on 1 January 2009. 
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actually 345,000 workers were registered from the new member states in this time pe-
riod (Boeri and Brücker 2005, Home Office 2007). Until the fourth quarter of 2008, the 
Border & Immigration Agency of the British Home Office counted 964,565 applicants 
from EU-8 countries who had registered for a work permit since May 2004 (Home Of-
fice 2009). Most of these labour migrants (64%) came from Poland. Between May 2004 
and May 2006, Ireland issued 205,000 labour permits to nationals from the new East 
European Union member states. Nevertheless, actual labour migration from the EU-8 to 
the UK and Ireland is most likely overestimated because official data count workers, not 
jobs, include temporary workers and do not exclude those who did not take up the job 
they registered for.
9 
To the contrast, the number of new work permits issued by Germany to nationals 
from East European member states was only a little bit higher in 2004 (317,835) than in 
the year before (310,339). In both years more than 95% of work permits were short-
term labour contracts, predominantly for seasonal work in agriculture. In 2005 the num-
ber of new work permits issued to EU-8 nationals in Germany decreased to 252,261, in 
2006 to 234,364 work allowances, again consisting to more than 90% of short term sea-
sonal labour contracts. Although the immigration of workers from the new East Euro-
pean member states to Germany was quite moderate, a number of EU-8 nationals most 
likely entered as posted workers or as workers claiming to be self-employed, to avoid 
the restrictions by transitional arrangements. In the case of Sweden, which did not re-
strict the immigration of East European Union nationals after enlargement, 3,514 work 
related permits were issued in 2004. This number turned out to be lower than predicted 
by the Boeri and Brücker (2005) forecast (6,154). In 2005, not more than 4,500 work 
allowances to EU-8 nationals were registered in Sweden. 
Summarizing East-West movements after enlargement, the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities (2006) discovered no evidence either from administrative sources or 
from the Labour Force Survey to show a direct link between the magnitude of mobility 
flows from EU-8 member states and the transitional arrangements in place. Transitional 
arrangements were basically expected to delay labour market adjustments, with the risk 
of creating ‘biased’ destination patterns. In a similar way, Boeri and Brücker (2005: 15) 
argued that the dissimilar introduction of transitional arrangements in EU-15 countries 
had affected primarily the destination search of East-West migration movements. 
As a result of post-enlargement East-West movements, the migrant population from 
EU-8 states in EU-15 countries increased by 42% between 2004 and 2006, although a 
considerable number of labour flows were short-term (Brücker 2007: 8). However, the 
share of the working age population from the EU-8 states in the EU-15 is still compara-
tively small. It made up 0.4% in December 2005 as compared to 0.2% in 2004. (Com-
mission of the European Communities 2006: 9). It has to be remarked that some EU-15 
countries, such as the UK and Ireland received a higher-than-average share of immi-
grants from the EU-8, although Italy, Spain, Norway, Germany and Austria were ad-
dressed as well. In absolute figures, the most important sending country was Poland 
                                                 
9 In addition some workers from EU-8 countries who had already taken up a job prior to enlargement 
might have used the registration scheme to legalize their status. 
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followed by Slovakia and the Baltic states. According to a World Bank study, in Slova-
kia, Poland and Estonia approximately 1% of the working age population had moved to 
the EU-15 between May 2004 and December 2005. Lithuania lost 3.3% of its popula-
tion in working age in that period and Latvia 2.4% (World Bank 2006b: 22). 
 
 
2.2 Post-enlargement migration: the experience of sending EU  
countries 
Because post-enlargement emigration from the new European Union members has a 
comparatively short history, not much empirical insight into the impacts of these move-
ments on sending countries have been gained yet. So far, simulation models have been 
developed to analyse the potential implications of post-enlargement migration for the 
economic development in sending and receiving EU countries (Brücker 2007, Barrell et 
al. 2007). In addition, some studies exist which empirically analyse the outcomes of 
recent labour emigration for Poland and the Baltic states (World Bank 2006b, 
Kaczmarczyk and Okolski 2008). 
 
 
2.2.1 Labour market aspects 
As has been discussed earlier, the outflow of workers leads to a decreasing labour sup-
ply, potentially generating a fall in unemployment rates, an increase of labour shortages 
and/or wages. It has been observed that unemployment rates decreased considerably in 
the Baltic after 2004 and in Poland after 2006, particularly among younger people 
(Kaczmarczyk and Okolski 2008: 43). According to some studies the emigration of for-
merly unemployed or underemployed workers caused a reduction of unemployment 
rates in these states (Heinz and Ward-Warmedinger 2006: 29). At the same time va-
cancy rates increased in the Baltic and Poland, while several economic sectors experi-
enced serious labour shortages. This was the case in construction, health care, retail 
sales, services and – limited to Poland – in agriculture (World Bank 2006b: 23). In the 
Baltic, the annual average wages grew remarkably between 2004 and 2006,
10 while in 
Poland only specific sectors – primarily health care, construction and agriculture – were 
characterized by wage increases. For some authors these developments were closely 
linked to post-enlargement emigration (Heinz and Ward-Warmedinger 2006), others 
were more cautious (Wold Bank 2006a, Kaczmarczyk and Okolski 2008). 
In their study on the economic impacts of post-enlargement migration in Poland and 
the Baltic states, Kaczmarczyk and Okolski (2008) point to the fact that high labour 
emigration occurred simultaneously to the process of economic transformation and EU 
integration in these countries. This makes it obviously difficult, to disentangle the ef-
                                                 
10 In Latvia recent wage increases are expected to bear the risk of strengthening inflationary processes 
and hampering economic growth. 
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fects of all of these processes on labour market developments. Economic prosperity and 
growth resulting from economic transformation and EU enlargement can be expected to 
be important drivers for labour shortages. Hungary and the Czech Republic, for exam-
ple, faced rising labour shortages after enlargement, although they did not experience 
remarkable emigration. In any case, labour emigration strengthens the effects of eco-
nomic transformation and EU integration in EU-8 countries. 
Simulation models on the impacts of post-enlargement labour migration also found 
decreasing unemployment rates and increasing wages in new EU member states to ac-
company the outflow of labour (Brücker 2007: 20; Barrell et al. 2007: 9). In this con-
text, potential welfare effects for the EU as whole were pointed out. Because the low 
income segment in sending EU-8 countries benefits in connection to lower unemploy-
ment and higher wages, the income distribution in the enlarged EU tends to equalize 
(Brücker 2007: 21). In addition the effects of labour migration on GDP development in 
sending economies were analysed. As can be expected, output in labour sending EU-8 
countries tends to decrease as a result of labour exports after enlargement (Brücker 
2007: 20, Barrell et al. 2007: 9). 
 
 
2.2.2 Brain drain, educational impacts and return migration 
The results of labour emigration depend to a considerable degree on the skill composi-
tion of those people who leave. Particularly the emigration of highly skilled people had 
evoked great concerns in EU-8 countries prior to enlargement.
11 Actually there are 
some indications for a certain brain drain after EU accession (Horvat 2004). For exam-
ple, medical professionals from Poland, Lithuania and Estonia seem to have moved in 
relative high numbers abroad. Furthermore, a considerable emigration potential exists 
among physicians and nurses in Poland as well as in the Baltic (Kaczmarczyk and Okol-
ski 2008: 62). In these countries, the emigration among (highly) skilled professionals in 
the health care sector is not only anticipated to result in adverse economic effects but 
also in a corrosion of the health sector at home. 
What can be said about the relationship between the emigration of highly skilled 
people in EU-8 countries and educational attainments at home? Prior to EU enlargement 
Lundborg and Rechea (2002) analysed the outcome of a potential brain drain for the 
human capital development in Eastern European accession countries. They expected a 
growing emigration of skilled labour from EU-8 countries to manifest in wage increases 
of the skilled and therefore a stimulation of more education and schooling among those 
who stay behind. While the outflow of skilled workers would lower growth, positive 
effects on growth would be expected from better educated workers at home. Although 
the authors found net effects of skilled emigration on growth to be negative, positive 
effects on education and schooling among the population at home were likewise no-
ticed. A further study showed that increasing migration opportunities in countries that 
                                                 
11 See Krieger 2004: 28 
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joined the EU in the 1980ies and in 2004 encouraged investments in higher education at 
home (Farchy 2009).
12 
Short-term migration seems to play an important role in new East-West movements, 
leading to the return of migrants who had went abroad. Meanwhile studies exist which 
analyse the economic performance of return migrants at home. In Latvia for example 
return migrants are found to earn higher wages compared to people who had stayed at 
home (Hazans 2008). In the case of Hungary, only female labour migrants received a 
wage premium after returning, while male migrants did not benefit from moving out 
(Co et al. 2000). 
In evaluating labour migration from EU-8 countries and their impacts on sending re-
gions in the longer run, out migration has to be related to the demographic development 
in these countries. In the EU-8, population declines even faster than in EU-15 countries. 
Thus, the potential effects of labour migration are reinforced by a shrinking labour 
force. For most EU-8 countries the potential for labour migration will significantly slow 
in the medium term. Because of moderate emigration and a comparable stable economic 
situation a number of EU-8 states, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 




In most cases, the outflow of labour is accompanied by an inflow of remittances into the 
home countries of emigrants. This is particularly relevant in the beginning of new la-
bour movements and in the case of short-term or circular migration. If one looks at re-
cent migration patterns in EU-8 countries, remittances should be especially prominent 
in Poland and the Baltic states. This is confirmed by official data released by the World 
Bank which found an increase of remittances in Poland by 164%, in Latvia by 279%, in 
Lithuania by 541% and in Estonia by 788% between 2003 and 2006.
13 Although Poland 
received 4.36 billion USD in form of remittances in 2006, the share of remittances in 
GDP amounted only to 1.3% in this country. In the Baltic the percentage of remittances 
in GDP was somewhat higher, ranging from 2.6% in Estonia, to 2.5% in Latvia and to 
2.1% in Lithuania. 
The economic impact of remittances depends primarily on the way, these transfers 
are spend in the home country. In a first attempt to evaluate the impacts of remittances 
on the economic performance in transition economies, Leon-Ledesma and Piracha 
(2004) showed that investments as well as private consumption would increase in East-
                                                 
12 This study used a cross-country panel regression including Spain, Portugal, Greece and the 2004 acces-
sion states. 
13 It has to be remarked that official data on remittances include bank transfers, non-banking money trans-
fer operators and post office transfers. Other important channels for remittances, such as cash and com-
modity transfers or the use of informal money transfer services are not taken into account. This results in 
an underestimation of remittances in official data. For a discussion of these problems see (Alfieri et al. 
2005) 
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ern European transition countries, following the receipt of remittances.
14 According to 
their study, remittances would be divided in a similar way between investment and con-
sumption as other incomes earned. To the contrast, Kaczmarczyk and Okolski (2008) 
pointed to the disproportional high relevance of private consumption in the spending of 
remittances in the case of Poland shortly before Eastern enlargement. Nevertheless, for 
a certain group of migrants they discovered a tendency to invest in human capital, either 
for the migrants’ themselves or for their children. In relating these experiences to recent 
EU-8 labour migration, one would expect a relatively high share of the income gains 
from these movements to transform into benefits for non-migrants at home through the 
channel of remittances. On potentially adverse effects of remittances no empirical re-
search has been conducted yet. 
 
2.2.4 Social impacts 
It can be expected that labour movements from EU-8 countries do not only influence 
the economic situation in sending countries but also social relations and educational 
prospects at home. Although no comprehensive studies have been conducted on these 
issues, anecdotic evidence point to changing family structures and gender roles as well 
as to new chances and risks for children in migrant families left behind. In a number of 
cases, the emigration of female household members led to a decreasing family cohesion 
and child-welfare at home. On the other hand, especially female migrants pay for a bet-
ter education for their children and for an improvement in private consumption and 
housing (Hurrle and Endter 2006). In countries with very high emigration rates such as 
Albania, the outflow of many people in working age has not only left children without 
proper care but also the elderly. As a result of emigration, a lot of elderly in Albania 
became a particularly vulnerable and isolated group (King and Vullnetari 2006). 
 
                                                 
14 This study looked at Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Rus-
sia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine at the aggregate level. 
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3 Migration and remittances in Macedonia: experience and per-
spectives 
At present, Macedonia is a migrant receiving, sending and transit country, although 
none of these flows is particularly high according to official data. Because Macedonia is 
a comparatively small country, hosting a population of 2,042,000 people in 2007 
(TransMONEE 2008), migration movements can be expected to have noticeable eco-
nomic and social effects for the country. Furthermore it has to be considered that only 
64% of Macedonians citizens are ethnic Macedonians, while 25% belong to the Alba-
nian minority (see table 1). Turks (3.8%), Roma (2.7%) and Serbs (1.8%) form addi-
tional relevant ethnic communities in Macedonia. Thus migration may also have an im-
pact on the ethnic composition of the country and on ethnic relations. 
 
Table 1:   Population of Macedonia by ethnic affiliation (2002) 
Ethnicity 2002  census 
Macedonian   1,297,981   
Albanian   509,083   
Turkish   77,959   
Roma   53,879   
Serbian   35,939   
Other   40,404   
All   2,015,245   
Source: National statistical office of Macedonia 
 
 
3.1 Macedonia’s migration history 
Although this study is interested in the impact of migration and remittances in today’s 
Macedonia, a historical overview of migration experiences in the region will be re-
quired to understand the development of present movements. Macedonia looks back at a 
comparatively long emigration history, including ethnic Macedonians as well as citizens 
of today’s Macedonia belonging to other ethnic groups, mainly Albanians. Since the 
end of the nineteenth century, a considerable number of people have left the territory of 
Macedonia in its present borders for Western European and overseas destinations. At 
the turn of the 20
th century, the emigration from the region was triggered by political 
conflicts under the Ottoman Empire as well as by economic hardship (CRPM 2007: 
5ff). The main destinations in that period were overseas countries, such as the United 
States, Australia and Canada. As admission regulations and employment opportunities 
were most favourable in Canada, a sizeable Macedonian immigrant group established 
there in the first two decades of the 20
th century (van Selm 2007). 
After World War II, people from today’s Macedonia – which belonged to Yugoslavia 
in that time – migrated because of ethnic reasons, a natural catastrophe and economic 
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problems. Between 1948 and 1959 a considerable number of ethnic Turks left Mace-
donia to settle in Turkey. The earthquake in Skopje in 1963 which made 100,000 people 
homeless as three quarters of the city were destroyed, promoted emigration from the 
region. In the aftermath of this catastrophe, many inhabitants of Skopje moved to Aus-
tralia and settled with the help of Macedonian communities there. Macedonians also 
took part in guest worker movements to Western European destinations, above all to 
Switzerland, Germany and Austria. Most labour migrants in that period were male and a 
sizeable part belonged to the Albanian minority (CRPM 2007: 8). Furthermore, internal 
migration took place within the borders of former Yugoslavia, reflecting economic as 
well as family related motivations. Following Macedonia’s independence, migration 
was caused by economic problems and by severe ethnic clashes such as the 1999 Kos-
ovo crisis. This conflict turned Macedonia into a destination of refugees, as 360,000 
people entered the country within a period of two months. With the exception of ap-
proximately 3,000 Roma from Kosovo, all refugees returned to their home country 
(CRPM 2007: 9). 
 
 
3.2 The Macedonian diaspora 
It is rather difficult to identify the number and the socio-demographic background of 
Macedonians who live outside their country of origin. While official 2002 census data 
found 22,995 Macedonians living outside the country, estimations range from 350,000 
to 2 million people (van Selm 2007, CRPM 2007). OECD statistics and national census 
data of immigration countries give a rough picture of Macedonians registered abroad 
(see table 2).
15 According to these sources approximately 460,000 Macedonians reside 
outside the country, i.e. 23% of the total Macedonian population. It has to be considered 
though that this group consists of people with different migration experiences. While 
some of them have moved decades ago into the destination regions, others belong to the 
group of recent migrants. 
Population statistics in receiving countries (in most cases census data) reflect legal 
immigrants, while they do not count people who entered without legal permission. 
Therefore official data on Macedonian citizens living abroad can be expected to repre-
sent a lower limit. In former Yugoslavia, Serbia hosts the largest Macedonian minority, 
including 25,847 people according to the population census in 2002. A group of 4,270 
Macedonians lives in Croatia, 3,972 Macedonians settle in Slovenia and 2,278 Macedo-
nians are registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Markiewicz 2006: 12). In Albania, the 
Macedonian minority consists of 4,697 people. Thus, the Macedonian minority in for-
mer Yugoslavia and Albania sums up to approximately 41,000 people, or 2% of the 
Macedonian total population. 
 
                                                 
15 The Macedonian diaspora includes people of ethnic Macedonian descent and persons with a Macedo-
nian citizenship. Because census administrations in various countries do not distinguish clearly between 
ethnic belonging and citizenship, it is not possible to disentangle these two definitions. 
  13OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper Nr.281 
 
Table 2:   Macedonian population living abroad 
 Census  year  Foreigners  Nationals  Unknown  All 
Albania* 1989        4,697 
Australia* 2001        81,989 
Bosnia and Herzegovina*  2005        2,278 
Canada* 2001        31,270 
Croatia* 2001        4,270 
New Zealand  2001      591  591 
Serbia* 2002        25,847 
Switzerland* 2007        60,509 
Turkey  2000  1,355  30,160  31,515 
United States*  2002        51,955 
EU-27       
Austria* 2008        16,587 
Belgium 2001  38  8    46 
Bulgaria* 2001  5,071      5,071 
Czech  Republic  2001  406  124 3 533 
Denmark 2002  1,301  306    1,607 
Finland 2000  22      22 
France 1999  1,798  762    2,560 
Germany* 2008  62,474      62,474 
Greece  2001  662  274  936 
Hungary  2001  49  24  73 
Ireland 2002  34  1    35 
Italy* 2008        78,090 
Luxemburg 2001  243  11    254 
Netherlands 2000  16  7    23 
Poland  2001  72  132  204 
Portugal 2001  9  3    12 
Slovakia 2001  103  50  3  156 
Slovenia 2002        3,972 
Spain 2001  185  20    205 
Sweden  2003  1,068  1,903  2,971 
United Kingdom  2001      1,285  1,285 
Source: OECD data base, *national statistical offices (only foreign citizens are recorded) 
 
It has already been pointed out that Macedonians moved in relatively high numbers 
to overseas and Western European destinations. This is reflected in rather big Macedo-
nian communities in Australia, Canada and the United States. In overseas destinations, a 
considerable part of Macedonian immigrants are citizens of the receiving states. Fur-
thermore fairly large Macedonian minorities can be found in Germany, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Austria and Italy. While in Turkey most migrants from Macedonia are ethnic 
Turks who have adopted the Turkish citizenship, in Switzerland and EU-27 countries, 
Macedonians have predominantly entered as labour migrants and are part of the foreign 
population. Austria, Germany and Switzerland represent traditional countries of immi-
gration for Macedonians in the context of the guest worker movement, whereas Italy 
has established as a new destination region for Macedonian labour migrants. In recent 
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years Macedonian authorities became increasingly aware of the Macedonian diaspora as 




3.3 Migration in Macedonia since independence 
Officially registered emigration and immigration flows in Macedonia were compara-
tively low since independence, with net migration being positive since 1993 (see figure 
1).
17 The majority of immigrants to Macedonia came from neighbouring countries, such 
as Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, most likely relating to ethnic affiliations and eco-
nomic motivations (CRPM 2007, CRPM 2008). Presumably, migration figures in gen-
eral are underreported, as only those persons are counted as migrants who have offi-
cially registered their migration activities. In most cases, those who leave and (re)enter 




















Figure 1:   Immigration, emigration and net migration in Macedonia (1992-2005) 
Source: Transmonee Database 2008 
                                                 
16 According to van Selm (2007) four members of the diaspora have been appointed to key cabinet posi-
tions following the 2006 elections to stimulate foreign investments. 
17 These data refer to the TransMONEE 2008 data base. According to other sources (Roberts et al. 2008) 
net migration has been negative since 2004, although the numbers were not very high. Roberts et al. 
(2008) report a negative netmigration of 113 persons in 2004 and of 758 persons in 2005 by 758. 
18 There is some information on illegal migration activities in Macedonia. In 2005, for example, 2,050 
Macedonian citizens were readmitted to Macedonia from Western European countries after they had 
illegally crossed the border (van Selm 2007: 5). In 2007 a number of 528 persons were readmitted (IOM 
2009). 
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In Macedonia, only little sound information on the motivation and characteristics of 
emigrants exist. In summer 2007, a survey has been conducted with 1,046 respondents 
representing Macedonian households that receive remittances from abroad (Roberts 
2008).
19 This research found the wish to earn a higher income, an unsuccessful job search 
at home and better living conditions abroad among the most important reasons for emigra-
tion. Only a small minority of emigrants (3.3%) had left Macedonia because of educa-
tional motivations. More than half of all emigrants in this study worked in three European 
countries, namely in Germany (19.3%), Switzerland (18.5%) and Italy (17%). The USA 
(12%) and Australia (10.5%) were further relevant destination regions. A considerable 
part of emigrants (42.9%) had been away for more than 10 years, while a quarter (25.9%) 
had resided outside the country between 6 and 10 years. According to the survey, ap-
proximately 25% of emigrants had a college degree or a higher education, while 56.3% 
were occupied as manual workers abroad. Because this research was not concerned with 
current emigration, no conclusions on brain drain in Macedonia can be drawn. 
 
 
3.3.1 Aspects of brain drain 
In a recent survey study alarming results with respect to brain drain were found in Ma-
cedonia (Janeska 2003). According to this research, nearly 15,000 tertiary educated Ma-
cedonians resided outside the country in 2002, representing more than 15% of Macedo-
nians holding a university education. Janeska (2003) indicated that highly skilled emi-
gration from Macedonia is basically permanent and has seriously increased in the 
1990ies. Although the total number of researchers in Macedonia decreased by 8.6% 
between 1997 and 2003 (Breinbauer 2007: 15), there is no proof that this decline has 
resulted from an emigration of the highly skilled. However, in 2007 labour market data 
in Macedonia reveal a certain shortage of highly educated persons especially in techni-
cal science which could be related to recent emigration (CRPM 2008). According to the 
survey study conducted by Janeska, approximately 85% of university students plan to 
leave the country after having finished their studies (Janeska 2003). Next to economic 
motivations, unfavourable educational and research conditions as well as little expecta-
tions for an improvement of this situation in the future were given as reasons. 
A comprehensive data collection on the stock of skilled migrants in OECD countries 
showed that nearly one fifth (19.6%) of Macedonian migrants had at least tertiary edu-
cation (Docquier and Marfouk 2005). Because it is not clear from these data where mi-
grants completed their studies, no further conclusion on recent brain drain can be 
drawn. Admittedly, these data confirm a rather high educational attainment by a part of 
the Macedonian diaspora in OECD countries. This does not necessarily mean that Ma-
cedonian labour migrants abroad are occupied according to their education (IOM 2009). 
Especially recent (temporary) migrants seem to work below their skill level which may 
be explained by the fact that their human capital is not transferable to the foreign labour 
                                                 
19 It has to be considered that this survey portrays migrants who remit, i.e. the focus is not on recent mi-
grants. 
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market. However, if tertiary educational standards in Macedonia would be adjusted to 
the standards of destination countries, highly skilled migrants might be able to use their 
skills abroad – though the probability of brain drain would most likely be increased.
20 
With respect to current labour migration, the Macedonian Early Warning Report 
2007 (UNDP 2007) discovered that 0.1% of ethnic Macedonians were temporarily 
working abroad in 2007, while 1.3% of Albanians and 3.7% of other nationalities in 
Macedonia did so. Males were to a much higher degree (1.1%) involved in temporary 
labour migration than females (0.2%). When asked, where respondents would see their 
future and that of their children in terms of employment, 22.9% of ethnic Macedonians, 
15,7% of Albanians and 38.5% of other nationalities answered they would like to work 
abroad. In the case of labour migration plans the gender gap was not remarkable: 24.3% 
of males and 21.3% of females were interested in labour migration. 
 
 
3.3.2 Characteristics of transit movements 
Next to emigration and immigration, Macedonia is a country of transit movements, al-
though the information on these movements is very limited. It is assumed that transit 
migration through Macedonia consists of people who enter the country illegally to move 
on to European Union destinations. Between 2002 and 2008, Macedonian border police 
apprehended 17,263 irregular migrants, predominantly citizens of Albania (79%), Ser-
bia and Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova (IOM 2009). Because Macedonia 
borders two European Union states since 2007 (Greece and Bulgaria), transit migrants 
to the European Union now enter via Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, its non-EU 
neighbours. In the years to come, transit migrants heading towards the European Union 
through Macedonia are expected to belong primarily to the group of Albanians, as the 
Balkan route has become increasingly troublesome for migrants from other countries 
(van Selm 2007). Resulting from its geographic location on the crossroad between East 
and West, Macedonia also functions as a transit region for human trafficking and smug-
gling. In some cases victims are trafficked internally, although the majority of persons 
trafficked through Macedonia to South Central and Western Europe comes from 
Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia and Albania. As has been pointed out by the recent ‘Traffick-
ing in Persons Report’ of the U.S. Department of State (2008: 169), the Macedonian 
government has meanwhile proactively implemented an anti-trafficking plan, which 
fully complies with the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. 
 
 
3.3.3 Migration perspectives 
Concerning migration perspectives in Macedonia, emigration can be expected to pose 
the greatest challenges.
21 A number of arguments point to an increasing pressure for 
                                                 
20 This dilemma has been described by Mattoo et al. 2005. 
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economically motivated emigrations, although some of these movements might be tem-
porary. First of all, high differences in income between Macedonia and European Union 
countries exist, which are geographically comparatively close. In 2007, for instance, the 
GDP per head in Macedonia amounted to 27% of that in Greece and to 71% of that in 
Bulgaria, thus providing a solid migration motivation. Furthermore, the high unem-
ployment rate in Macedonia, which is particularly prevalent for ethnic Albanians and 
Roma, acts as a push factor.
22 Emigration to European countries might also be sup-
ported by Macedonian communities in destination regions in lowering costs and risks of 
going abroad. Against this background it is not surprising that the Macedonian Early 
Warning Report 2007 (UNDP 2007) found people in Macedonia relating the EU acces-
sion of the country to better migration options. When asked which changes the Euro-
pean Union membership of Macedonia would bring for respondents’ life, 22.5% of eth-
nic Macedonians, 44.1% of Albanians and 32.8% of other nationalities answered it 
would improve to the opportunity to work abroad. 
While economic and network arguments point to a considerable emigration pressure 
in Macedonia, emigration movements are severely restricted by legal measures on the 
part of most receiving countries. Particularly in the European Union, restraining migra-
tion policies still control the inflow of (labour) migrants from Macedonia. Although the 
European Union may not be especially concerned by potential labour migration from 
Macedonia after EU accession because of its comparatively small population size, tem-
porary restrictions on labour movements might nevertheless be imposed. This might be 
mainly the case in countries with a relatively high Macedonian immigrant population, 
such as Germany, Austria and Italy. However, as has been seen in past EU enlarge-
ments, migrants from Macedonia might move to those EU destinations that open up 
their labour markets. In case a potentially labour exporting country, such as Albania 
should join the EU in the same time, Macedonia might think of introducing a transition 




3.3.4 The impact of remittances 
Connected to a long lasting migration history, remittance flows into Macedonia are re-
markable. However, as in many other remittances receiving countries in the world, offi-
cial data on remittances are scarce and they may significantly underreport actual money 
transfers, as many migrants send remittances via informal channels. A recent World 
Bank report argued that unrecorded remittances may at least add 50% to officially 
counted flows (World Bank 2006a: xiii). According to official data, which include 
                                                                                                                                               
21 Immigration has not been very large and there is no indication for a remarkable growth of immigration 
in the near future (Roberts et al. 2008). 
22 The unemployment rate in Macedonia amounted to 35% in 2007 (Commission of the European Com-
munities 2008). 
23 As in the case of EU-15 states political arguments might be more important in introducing a transition 
period to labour migration than economic ones. 
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workers’ remittances and compensation of employees, remittances to Macedonia have 
steadily grown since 2000 (see table 3). 
 
Table 3:   Remittance flows towards and from Macedonia  
  (in millions of US dollars) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008e 
Inward  remittance  flows  81  73  106 174 213 226 267 267 315 
of which           
Workers’  remittances  80  68  92  146 161 169 198     
Compensation of employees    5  14  28  52  57  69     
Outward  remittance  flows 14 21 23 16 16 16 18 18   
of which           
Workers’  remittances  14 21 23 15 15 14 16     
Compensation of employees      1  1  1  2  2     
Source: Ratha and Xu 2008, World Bank 2009 
 
While in 2000 the inflow of remittances made up 81 millions of USD or 2.2% of 
GDP, in 2007 it amounted to a GDP share of 3.5% (267 millions of USD). Compared to 
foreign direct investments (FDI), the inflow of remittances was higher in the period 
between 2002 and 2005. In addition, foreign direct investments were much more volati-
le. Consistent with an(see figure 2) altruistic motivation, remittances were not depend-
ent on economic cycles. It is remarkable that the country received a substantial and inc-
reasing inflow of remittances although a considerable part of the Macedonian diaspora 
has been abroad for a comparatively long period. This indicates that Macedonians 
emigrants keep up strong ties with their home country and are in general willing to sup-
port their families back home. 
By definition of the IMF and the World Bank, official remittances data include mi-
grants’ transfers in addition to workers’ remittances and compensation of employees. 
This figure can not be calculated in the case of Macedonia, because the Macedonian 
national bank records migrants’ transfers as part of cash exchange which also incorpo-
rates payments for unrecorded trade and services. An estimation which included all 
three remittances categories found remittances in Macedonia to amount to 15.2% of 
GDP in 2004 (Mansoor and Quillin 2007). This put Macedonia on place eight among 25 
remittances receiving countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
To get a better understanding of the receipt and the use of remittances in Macedonia, 
the results of a survey will be used which had been conducted in the country in 2007 
(Roberts et al. 2008). According to this research only 38.6% of remittances were sent 
home by formal money transfers (for example through Western Union) or bank trans-
fers. In most cases (44.4%) labour migrants physically transported their money back 
home. Apparently, the dependence on remittances is a persistent issue in Macedonia, as 
nearly 62% of remittances receiving households relied upon these sources of income 
since five years and more. The survey also revealed that remittances were most impor-
tantly used for current consumption (74.1%), although savings (13.7%), construction  
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Figure 2:   Remittances and foreign direct investments in Macedonia 2001-2006 
  (in millions of US dollars) 
Source: EBRD 2007: 139, Ratha and Xu 2008, National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia 
 
and maintenance of houses (14.5%) were of relevance as well. To the contrast, invest-
ments into business start ups (2.6%), real estate (0.7) or portfolio (0.3%) played a negli-
gible role.
24 Unfortunately it is not possible to assess the effect of remittances on the 
labour supply of households as no information on this issue exists. 
Beyond doubt remittances contribute to the economic wellbeing of Macedonian 
households and in a number of cases to poverty reduction. Thus it is of high relevance 
how the current global crisis may impact on the receipt of remittances in Macedonia. 
Although remittances to developing countries are still expected to fall less than private 
capital flows or official development aid, in 2009 a decline in remittances of 5 to 8 per-
cent to developing countries is forecasted by World Bank experts (Ratha and Mohapatra 
2009). This is related to job losses of labour migrants who work in sectors that are par-
ticularly hit by the economic crisis such as construction, manufacturing, services and 
tourism and to a possible reduction in migrants’ wages. Especially those migrants will 
be affected by the global crisis who have emigrated recently and who perform irregular 
work. Migrants may return home if they loose their jobs abroad, although legal migrants 
will have a very strong incentive to stay, as the economic crisis is expected to affect 
labour exporting regions deeper than destination countries. In the case of Macedonia a 
reduction of remittances is likely to occur in the year to come, resulting from a weaken-
ing of job markets in destination countries, a tightening of immigration controls and the 
return of recent (irregular) migrants. On the other hand, Macedonia can count on a com-
                                                 
24 The survey asked for spending priorities according to four categories: most important, important, least 
important and not important. Only the answers for the category ‘most important’ are reported here. 
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paratively big Diaspora abroad which so far has been firmly engaged in sending remit-
tances home. This may contribute to a steadiness of remittance flows in face of the 
global economic crisis. 
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4 Conclusion and policy recommendations 
The understanding of migration movements and of remittances is a relevant issue for 
Macedonia in the course of the European Union accession. It has to be pointed out 
though that migration behaviour as well as the sending and the use of remittances are to 
a great extent based on private decisions which make them particularly difficult to in-
fluence by state policy. In the context of migration and remittances, governments are 
commonly most interested in enhancing the opportunities of migration and remittances 
for their countries and in reducing the risks. Referring to this aim the Macedonian gov-
ernment is facing the following challenges: 
•  Governmental policies with respect to migration and remittances have to rely on 
comprehensive information on the topics at stake. In Macedonia data on migra-
tion – referring to flow as well as to stock data – are partly lacking. It seems that 
emigration and immigration flows are not completely recorded. No good infor-
mation on the education, the regional background, the ethnic affiliation and the 
gender of emigrants and immigrants exist. This is likewise the case for the Ma-
cedonian diaspora abroad. Furthermore, the inflow of remittances is not docu-
mented according to the standards of the IMF and there is no solid information 
on the transfer and use of these sources. Next to basic data on migration and re-
mittances, surveys would be needed to get a better understanding of migration 
patterns (what are the determinants, destinations and characteristics of migrants) 
and of remittances’ impact (who receives remittances, do remittances reduce 
poverty, do they influence the labour supply, etc.). 
•  In Macedonia there are indications for a brain drain which will prevail in the 
near future. This situation seriously concerns Macedonian academics, govern-
mental representatives and NGOs. To address the (potential) loss of highly edu-
cated people, one option is to activate the resources of the highly skilled dias-
pora, i.e. in supporting the retention of knowledge based links between skilled 
migrants and R&D institutions at home (see for example the TOKTEN – Trans-
fer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals – program of the United Na-
tions). A further approach to deal with brain drain is directed towards brain cir-
culation, i.e. the encouragement of highly skilled persons who have gone abroad 
for some years to return. In this context, policies such as training, tax breaks and 
sustaining migrants’ social entitlements while abroad should be elaborated. To 
prevent brain drain young highly skilled persons might be encouraged to stay by 
improving salaries and working conditions in R&D institutions at home (see the 
joint UNESCO and HP project to reverse brain drain in Macedonia).
25 However, 
these initiatives have only a chance if human rights, democracy as well as eco-
nomic and political development do not deteriorate in the home country. 
•  As Macedonia is an accession country of the European Union, migration rela-
tions with European Union countries is of specific relevance (in addition Mace-
                                                 
25 The project was officially launched at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. See: 
http://portal.unesco.org/es/ev.php-URL_ID=27011&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
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donia has a meaningful diaspora in the European Union). In this context it might 
be crucial for Macedonian policy to relate to a recent green paper of the Euro-
pean Commission on the management of economic migration with third country 
nationals. This paper explicitly stated that labour migration flows should be 
managed in cooperation with the countries of origin, taking into account their 
reality and needs (Commission of the European Communities 2005). Among 
other suggestions this paper proposed: 
•  to improve the dissemination of information and advice on legal labour 
migration procedures and on the risks of irregular migration 
•  to encourage brain circulation of highly skilled 
•  to include low skilled labour into circular schemes by developing a 
framework of bilateral labour arrangements 
•  to ensure the protection and support of migrant workers according to in-
ternational standards. Related to this goal the Macedonian government 
should monitor recruitment activities by foreign agencies to lessen the 
abuse of Macedonian migrant workers abroad. 
Cooperation with the European Commission on this base could prepare future 
migration relations after enlargement, finally resulting in the free movement of 
workers. The Republic of Macedonia has already entered into this process in re-
leasing a resolution on migration policy for 2009-2014. 
•  With respect to the sending of remittances efforts should be made to improve of-
ficial sending channels for remittances, to increase trust in these channels and to 
lower transaction costs. 
•  Rare research in Macedonia suggests that remittances are predominantly spent 
for consumption, thus most likely supporting poor households. To attract further 
remittances from migrants abroad and to enhance the development impact of 
remittances it might be reasonable to establish special financial products for the 
diaspora. Furthermore, matching funding schemes for remittances with respect 
to business-start-ups, low cost housing or projects of Home Town Associations 
(or Migrant Associations) could be designed. 
To date comparatively little experience exist how the described policies might func-
tion in the context of South-Eastern European transition economies. Thus a thorough 
evaluation of migration and remittances patterns is a precondition for the introduction of 
one of these measures. 
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